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The Crisis in International Trade: Remarks at the 20th
Annual McGeorge International Law Symposium
Ronald F. Lipp*
I. INTRODUCTORY COMMENTS
It is an agreeable assignment to be asked to speak at the McGeorge
International Law Symposium, but an altogether weightier thing to be asked to
appear at an event that not only marks the twentieth anniversary of this series, but
that also addresses such an important topic as transnational business law for a
new century. On such an occasion, one is tempted to look back upon these
fleeting past twenty years-an inclination that is all the greater when one fears
that he has nothing to say about the future which is worthy of this milestone, and
hopes to divert his audience from perceiving that deficiency. Believing, as I do,
that the surest way to be rid of temptation is to yield to it, I would like to look
back for a few moments before looking forward.
II. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE
On the occasion of the first of these symposia, Ronald Reagan was newly
installed in the White House. The "Evil Empire" speech still lay sometime off in
the future, as did Margaret Thatcher's naval victories in the War of the Falkland
Islands. The American hostages were just returned from their 444-day ordeal in
Tehran. Our nation, and much of the rest of the world, struggled to understand
and cope with the implications of the revolution in Iran, and of the prospect of
hardening relations with the Soviet Union. The Dow Jones Industrial Average
hovered around the one thousand mark, as it had intermittently for nine years.
Thirty-year fixed-rate home mortgage interest rates stood at an astonishing
16.6%.
Despite this uneasy beginning, the 1980s inaugurated a period of nearly
unimaginable and mostly salutary transformation in much of the world. The
miracles of 1989 in Berlin, Prague, and Timosoara augured the end of the Cold
War, despite the nearly universal assurances of scholars a brief time earlier that
the Soviet Bloc would be with us forever-a fitting reminder, if one is required,
of the continuing need for humility among the intelligensia. Two years later, the
Soviet Union collapsed, the Cold War ended, and a re-unified Germany joined
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the Western community of nations with hardly a shot fired. To be sure, the good
tidings in Europe were tempered by the sad events in Tiananmen Square, and the
end of the Soviet Union was not entirely peaceful. One cannot but recall the
images of an ebullient Boris Yeltsin during the coup of August 1991, rallying his
supporters from atop one of the tanks which surrounded the Soviet parliamentary
White House.
Nonetheless, a great transformation took place and has generally been seen
as proof of the superiority of Western-and particularly American-culture.
From the perspective of the early twenty-first century, I think this conclusion is
undoubtedly correct. The Soviets ultimately assaulted their White House with
cannon; but in the 1990s, we merely demeaned ours.
Be that as it may, and notwithstanding the multiple wars, upheavals, and
other afflictions with which we all are familiar, the past twenty years have been a
time of unparalleled and largely unanticipated growth in material well-being and
freedom for most of the world. More people live longer and healthier lives in
more open and just societies than ever before. Despite predictions that material
consumption risks exhaustion of the world's resources, most commodities are
cheaper today than they were when Paul Ehrlich made his famous and ill-advised
wager in 1980 with Julian Simon.'
During the same period-and not coincidentally-there was also a dramatic
growth in international trade. To take only a single measure, in 1980, the
international commerce of the United States-the world's largest trading
nation-accounted for only 13 percent of its Gross Domestic Product (GDP).2 By
last year, that portion had increased to nearly 29 percent.3 In absolute terms, this
amounts to a four-fold expansion over the past twenty years in the value of
international commerce flowing through this country. International trade was
enhanced by the continual development of international statutory systems. Thus,
the United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods,
generally known as the Vienna Convention, went into effect in 1988.4 Most
major trading nations have now adopted it, although its ultimate impact remains
to be tested.
1. See Stephen Moore, The Coming Age of Abundance, in THE TRUE STATE OF THE PLANET 109, 132
(Ronald Bailey ed., 1995) (stating that in 1980, Simon bet Ehrlich "[ten thousand dollars] that the real price of
five natural resources of Ehrlich's own choosing would be less expensive in 1990 than in 1980. All five of the
resources Ehrlich chose--copper, chrome, nickel, tin, and tungsten-fell in price. Ehrlich lost the bet."); see
also John Tierney, Betting the Planet, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 2, 1990, at 52 (detailing the famous bet between Simon
and Ehrlich); Joseph Kellard, Reason vs. Faith: Julian Simon vs. Paul Ehrlich, CAPITALISM MAG., April 1998,
available at http://www.capitalismmagazine.com/l998apriUapril98-reason vs faith.htm (last visited Dec. 15,
2001) (copy on file with The Transnational Lawyer).
2. U.S. Department of Commerce International Trade Administration, GDP & U.S. International Trade
in Goods and Services, 1970-2000: National Income and Product Accounts Basis, at htip://www.ita.doc.gov/td/
industry/otea/usfth/aggregate/HLO0T05.txt (last visited Dec. 15, 2001) (on file with The Transnational Latvyer).
3. Id.
4. United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods, Apr. 11, 1980, 1489
U.N.T.S. 3, art. 72 (entered into force on Jan. 1, 1988).
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The Vienna Convention was followed in 1994 by the UNIDROIT Principles
of International Commercial Contracts, a multinational effort of the International
Institute for the Unification of Private Law. The goal was to produce a statement
of international contract principles, taking into account such recent codifications
of contract and commercial law as the revised Uniform Commercial Code (UCC)
and the Restatement Second of Contracts in the United States, the Netherlands'
Civil Code, and the 1985 Foreign Economic Contract Law of the People's
Republic of China.
The revisions of the UCC reflect the increasing importance of international
trade. Although the UCC is primarily a body of domestic contract law, it is
gradually morphing into a document of universal application. This is best
illustrated in the 1995 revisions of Article 5, governing Letters of Credit. This
Article now gives contracting parties unlimited latitude in their choice of what
jurisdiction's law-domestic or foreign-governs the liability of issuers of letters
of credit. It also provides that in the absence of explicit choice, liability will be
governed by rules of trade custom, including those in the Uniform Customs and
Practice for Documentary Credits of the International Chamber of Commerce.
This is a remarkable delegation of domestic legislative authority to privately
determined international trade custom. To date, all but one jurisdiction in the
U.S. have adopted the new Article 5.9
The period also witnessed a dramatic growth in international institutions and
regimes associated with trade and commerce. In 1980, the European Economic
Community (EEC) consisted of nine nations; ° the European Union (EU) now
includes fifteen, with another dozen or more in the queue for admission.1 The
Single European Act of 198712 and the Maastricht Treaty of 1991" led to the
5. International Institute for the Unification of Private Law, Principles of International Commercial
Contracts (1994) [hereinafter UNIDROIT Principles].
6. See Revised U.C.C. art. 5 (1995) (replacing the original article 5 of the Uniform Commercial Code,
which was enacted in 1953).
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. See Uniform Law Commissioners: The National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State
Laws, at http:llwww.nccusl.orglnccusl/uniformact factsheets/uniformacts-fs-ucca5.asp (last visited Nov. 2,
2001) (on file with The Transnational Lawyer) (noting that Wisconsin is the only remaining state which has not
enacted U.C.C. Article 5).
10. See Herbert L. Sherman, Jr., Seniority and the Harmonization Goal of the EEC, 4 CoMP. LAB. L.J.
26, 26 (1981) (clarifying that the nine members of the EEC in 1980 were: Belgium, Denmark, France,
Germany, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom).
11. See id. (specifying the nine original members of the EEC); see also Christopher F. Corr, Trade
Protection in the New Millennium: The Ascendancy of Antidumping Measures, 18 Nw. J. INT'L L. BUS. 49, 81
(1997) (observing that Austria, Finland, Greece, Portugal, Spain, and Sweden have been added to the list of EU
members).
12. Single European Act, 1987 O.J. (L 169) 1 (1987), [1987] 2 C.M.L.R. 741 (effective July 1, 1987).
13. Treaty on the European Union, Feb. 7, 1992, 1992 O.J. (C 224) 1, 31 I.L.M. 247 (1992) [hereinafter
Maastricht Treaty].
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European Monetary Union in 1999,' 4 which set the basis for financial integration
in Europe and the launching of the Euro. The 1986 Uruguay Round of the
General Agreement of Tariffs and Trade (GATT) 5 led to the formation of the
World Trade Organization (WTO) in 1994,16 which now has 142 members. 7 In
the same period, we have seen the formation of the Asia Pacific Economic
Corporation (APEC) (the Asian version of the WTO), MERCOSUR (the
southern Common Market), 8 and the North American Free Trade Agreement
(NAFTA). Older organizations have also evolved. To take one important
symbolic example: in 1997, the Group of Seven (G-7) expanded with the
addition of Russia to become the G-8.19
III. FACTORS AFFECTING THE FUTURE OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE
A. Adverse Developments Which May Threaten International Free Trade
At the beginning of the twenty-first century, there is good reason to believe
that the easy gains in international commerce may be behind us. The
accomplishments of the past twenty years have been accompanied by contrary
developments that threaten to undermine the consensus on which international
commerce rests, and without which, many of the gains of that period are at risk.
At worst, these adverse developments may lead to a fundamental shift away from
unimpeded free trade. At best, they present a challenge to those of us who believe
that free markets are the best means by which individual well-being and personal
freedom are promoted.
14. For a detailed discussion of the historical background leading up to the creation of the European
Monetary Union, see generally Youri Devuyst, The European Union's Constitutional Order? Between
Community Method and Ad Hoc Compromise, 18 BERK. J. INT'L LAW 1 (2000); see also Juan Luis Millan
Pereira, Regional Integration, National Identities and the Rights of Citizenship in Comparative Perspective:
Economic Restructuring and the European Monetary Union, 9 U. MIAMI INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 45 (2000); see
also Collette B. Cunningham, Note, In Defense of Member State Culture: The Unrealized Potential of Article
151(4) of the EC Treaty and the Consequences for EC Cultural Policy, 34 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 119 (2001).
15. See Marc Levinson, And You Thought NAFTA Was Nasty, NEWSWEEK, Nov. 29, 1993, at 54,
explaining that the Uruguay Round of trade talks began in 1986 in Punta del Este, Uruguay).
16. See Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations, Apr.
15, 1994, Legal Instruments-Results of the Uruguay Round vol. 1 (1994), 33 I.L.M. 1125 (1994) (forming the
World Trade Organization (WTO) in 1994). From 1947 until 1994, the GATT regulated international trade for
member nations, and it continues to regulate trade under the WTO. The WTO's primary function is to ensure
that member nations comply with the provisions of GATT, and also to settle disputes between member nations.
17. See WTO, The Organization: Members and Observers, at http://www.wto.org/english/thewto-
e/whatis_e/tife/org6_e.htm (last visited Nov. 4, 2001) (copy on file with The Transnational Lavver) (stating
that as of July 26, 2001, there were 142 member nations in the WTO).
18. "MERCOSUR" is the acronym for the Southern Cone Common Market. For a brief summary of its
history and functions, see Mercosur.com, Historic Brief at http://www.mercosur.conin/info/historia.jsp (last
visited Dec. 15, 2001) (copy on file with The Transnational Lawyer).
19. The Group of Seven (also known as the G-7) was expanded to include Russia in 1997, thereby
changing the group's name to G-8. See What is G8?, at http://birmingham.g8summit.gov.uk/briefO398/what.is.
g8.shtml (last visited Nov. 4, 2001) (copy on file with The Transnational Lawyer).
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Some of the strains on international commerce are the natural, if unintended,
consequences of its success. Our present trading system is largely an outgrowth
of conditions at the end of World War II. The principal trading nations then were
part of the Atlantic Community--chiefly Western Europe, the United States, and
Canada. Those nations, despite their undoubted differences, shared a broad base
of commercial customs, mutual trading experience, and political values.
Accommodation of expanding trade was manageable through a process of
negotiation and rule-making, left largely to lawyers, bankers, and bureaucrats.
The process was hardly visible to public gaze or needed to be. But that world is
gone forever.
Over the past twenty years, the universe of international commerce has
changed as dramatically as the political landscape. One reason is the
development of technology and the related evolution of financial and commercial
instruments. The early success of George Soros in almost single-handedly
breaking the British pound in the currency markets warned us that those markets
had developed a power beyond the ability of governments to easily control or
perhaps even to understand.2° The later financial crisis in Mexico,2' with the
apparent need for international intervention and assistance, was a sharp reminder
the growing interconnection of national economies is more than a clich6.
However, the real wake-up call occurred in the space of a single year,
beginning in mid-1997. During that summer, a major financial crisis swept
through East Asia, pummeling South Korea, Thailand, Indonesia, Malaysia, the
Philippines, and Japan.2 Two of those nations suffered economic collapse and
political upheaval.2 The others experienced sharp contractions, and still currently
struggle with the consequences. As a reminder of the region's difficulties, the
Nikkei stock index had plummeted to its lowest level in thirteen years.2 The
20. See Jay Mathews, Putting Currency Trading On Trial; Impact On Banks, Business Deals and
Economic Policy Raises Concern, WASH. POST, Aug. 22, 1993, at HI (explaining that one U.S. Representative
was concerned when George Soros made $1 billion during British Pound devaluation); see also Financier Soros
Adds to Pressure on European Exchange Rate System, L.A. TIMES, July 31, 1993, at DI.
21. The devaluation of the Mexican peso in December 1994 caused a major international financial crisis
which roiled markets in Latin America and elsewhere and precipitated international intervention. See generally
Francisco Gil-Diaz, The Origins of Mexico's 1994 Financial Crisis, Cato J., vol. 17 no. 3, available at http:ll
www.cato.orglpubs/joumallcjl7n3-14.html (last visited Dec. 15, 2001) (copy on file with The Transnational
Lawyer); see also Nora Lustig, The Mexican Peso Crisis: The Foreseeable and the Surprise, Brookings
Discussion Papers in International Economics, Brookings Institution (1996), at http://www.brook.edulviewsl
papers/lustig/1 14.htm (last visited Dec. 15, 2001) (copy on file with The Transnational Lawyer).
22. See Jerome I. Levinson, The International Financial System: A Flawed Architecture, 23 Fletcher F.
World Aff. 1, 20 (discussing the East Asian financial crisis).
23. Malaysia and Indonesia suffered economic collapse and political upheaval. See generally Ming-Yu
Cheng & Sayed Hossain, Malaysia and the Asian Turmoil, 2 ASLAN-PAC. L. & POL'Y J. 125 (discussing the
effects of the Asian Crisis in Malaysia).
24. In September 1998, the Nikkei fell to 13,406-its lowest level since January 1986. It had risen to
38,916 in December 1989. Data are monthly average values. See The Financial Forecast Center: Business,
Finance and Economic Data, Monthly International Stock Indices, at http://www.forecasts.org/data/index.htm
(last visited Dec. 15, 2001) (copy on file with The Transnational Lawyer). In November 2001, the Nikkei has
plummeted to nearly the 10,000 level.
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Asian crisis triggered global alarm. It also provoked serious criticism of the
International Monetary Fund (IMF), and of the various programs of international
assistance and advice offered by it and others.
Less than a year later, in August 1998, Russia defaulted on $40 billion in
public debt, held largely by foreign investors." On the nascent Russian stock
market, share values fell by nearly 90 percent. 26 The whole program of Western
aid, and of investment in Russia and other post-Communist countries, was
subjected to serious reappraisal.
These events involved a synergy of bad commerce, bad banking practices,
and bad politics. Heavy doses of corruption and political cronyism were the
hallmark of the Asian crisis. Furthermore, the Russian default raised serious
questions about collusion between government officials and Western investment
bankers who were hired to sell the bonds to an unknowing public. In fact,
corruption is endemic throughout the former Communist countries, and involves
not merely the greed and immorality of individual actors, but organized and
systematic looting of public and private enterprises. Thus, the Czechs have even
added a new, and very un-slavic word to their lexicon: "tunneling." This is the
underground process by which entrepreneurs and state managers systematically
cooperate in order to surreptitiously drain publicly-held enterprises, sometimes
using the resulting insolvency as a means to abscond with additional public funds
that are made available to rescue their victims.27 Additionally, in China, a popular
trade magazine features regular exposes of investment scams and commercial
frauds.28
B. The Struggle to Repair the Broken-Down Political Consensus Underlying
Our Trading System
By themselves, these cautionary tales may be no more than grounds for
increased diligence by managers and traders in international commerce, the sort
of effort for which they are well-paid and presumably qualified. But in our times,
these crises and scandals also serve to exacerbate a broader problem outside the
competence of managers and technicians: to repair-and insofar as possible
restore-the new fractured political consensus that once underlay our trading
25. See Money Can't Buy Me Love, THE ECONOMIST, Feb. 6, 1999, at 23 (detailing Russia's default).
26. See Yahoo! Finance, Moscow Times Index, at http://quote.yahoo.com (last visited Dec. 15, 2001)
(copy on file with The Transnational Lawyer).
27. The Czech word is "tunelovan." The economic and moral consequences of this phenomenon have
been widely discussed. See, e.g., Jefim Fistein, Soros Says Transition From Closed to Open Society Imperfect,
at http://www.rferl.org/nca/special/lOyears/overview5.html (last visited Dec. 15, 2001) (copy on file with The
Transnational Lawyer); see also John C. Coffee, Jr., Privatization and Corporate Governance: The Lessons
From Securities Market Failure, 25 IOWA J. CORP. L. 1, 23 (1999) (defining "tunneling").
28. The publication is "Caijing" or Business and Finance Review. See Peter Vonacott, A Muckraking
Magazine Digs Up Stock Scams in China, WALL ST. J., Feb. 23, 2001, at A13.
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system. Formed among trading nations in the wake of the devastation of World
War II, that consensus was that the creation of wealth is good in itself and
fundamentally important to social progress, and that free trade, buttressed by a
system of international arrangements, is the way to go about it.
Today, trade issues are no longer invisible to the man-on-the-street. There is
serious public uncertainty about the benefits of free trade, doubt that the creation
of wealth is good in itself, and deep suspicion about the purpose and effect of the
network of international arrangements that govern trade. To some degree, these
misgivings have always existed. What is different today is the coalescence of
opponents to the present trade system. The clearest demonstration of this point is
the opposition that has arisen to the WTO, exemplified by the clash at the
December 1999 WTO meeting in Seattle. The session was noisily and violently
disrupted by fifty thousand demonstrators, which generated worldwide media
attention.29 Other disruptions have occurred in Prague, London, Washington,
Philadelphia, Los Angeles, Melbourne, Genoa, and elsewhere.30
The array of protestors is informative. They include anarchists, opposed to
government generally; libertarians and nationalists, opposed to erosion of
sovereignty in particular; labor union activists, worried about the loss of jobs to
foreigners; human rights advocates, concerned about the working and living
conditions of those same foreigners; environmentalists seeking to constrain trade
through rules intended to combat global warming, pollution, or other ecological
ills; sundry animal rights supporters; Luddites; neo-Marxists; feminists;
spiritualists; and a few party animals. They could hardly be in greater
disagreement about the solutions for-or even the definitions of-the world's
ailments, but they all agree on the problem: free trade.
The same phenomenon may be seen in recent United States' presidential
elections. Do you remember Ross Perot's "great sucking sound" of jobs leaving
the United States? Ralph Nader on the far left, Pat Buchanan on the far right, and
Ross Perot on the far out, have agreed on very little, but they share a common
goal to restrain free trade because of its impact on their respective social visions.
In some cases, these protests and political campaigns reflect genuine and
fervent concerns over the actual or feared social and cultural impact of free trade.
In some cases, the campaigns reflect opposition to international structures that
are seen to diminish human freedom in the name of trade promotion. The latter is
certainly one source of opposition to the WTO and to the growing power of the
European Union. In other cases, the protests simply represent the judgment that
opposition to trade rules is a ready means for advancing diverse political
29. See A Global Disaster, THE ECONOMIsT, Dec. 11, 1999, at 19 (describing the Seattle protests); see
also Michael Elliott, The New Radicals, NEWSWEEK, Dec. 13, 1999, at 36-39 (same). An assessment of the
trade implications of the event in Seattle may be found in Ewell E. Murphy, Jr., The Legend of Seattle:
Learning From the Failed Third WTO Ministerial Conference, 13 TRANSNAT'L LAW. 273 (2000).
30. For local perspectives on the motives and incentives behind some of these protests, see generally
THE NEW PRESENCE: THE PRAGUE J. OF CENT. EUR. AFF. (Fall 2000).
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agendas.
Whatever their source or intention, this combination of interests has already
changed the terms of the political debate and begun to have practical
consequences. For example, in 1998, the U.S. House of Representatives-by a
vote of 243 to 180-denied President Clinton the "fast track" authority
traditionally enjoyed by presidents in negotiating international commercial
agreements.3 ' That authority is widely considered to be indispensable in
negotiating new trade arrangements. Notably, President George W. Bush's first
speech to the new Congress, on February 27, 2001, included a request for
approval of trade promotion authority.32
C. International Trade and The Culture Wars
Today, trade is no longer merely or even primarily a commercial question. It
has become inextricably caught up in the larger cultural wars of our times and the
fears and phobias that they entail. Nowhere is this more evident than in
connection with the issues surrounding biotechnology. The term "biotechnology"
encompasses a disparate range of emerging scientific developments with far-
reaching commercial implications, including genetic manipulations that result in
new grains and other foodstuffs, new manufacturing and processing techniques,
controversial medical processes for controlled production of human tissue using
fetal stem cells, and, of course, the cloning of animals, and ultimately human
beings. As an example of the difficulties that we confront in this area, on March
1, 2001, the first international treaty banning cloning of human beings came into
effect.33 This treaty, involving the forty-one member Council of Europe, notably
leaves open the question of defining what constitutes a "human being."'3
Most of these developments have such important and far-reaching scientific
and ethical impacts that the commercial aspects of biotechnology have inevitably
been subordinated and submerged. Additionally, because we do not yet
understand-and are therefore fearful of-the possible scientific and ethical
ramifications of biotechnology, the subject has been ripe for confusion and
exploitation. Recently, fears of "mad cow" disease, genetically engineered corn,
bacterial food contamination, and hoof and mouth disease have merged into a
sort of amorphous panic over food safety.
31. See Juliet Eilperin, House Defeats Fast-Track Trade Authority; Democrats Saw GOP-Scheduled
Vote as an Election Year Ploy to Divide Them, WASH. POST, Sept. 26, 1998, at A 10.
32. See Transcript of President Bush's Message to Congress on His Budget Proposal, N.Y. TIMES, Feb.
28, 2001, at A12.
33. See Council of Europe Bans Human Cloning, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, Mar. 2, 2001, at A6. For a
review of subsequent developments, see International Opposition to Cloning, Aug. 29, 2001, at http:llwww.
cnn.coml200l[WORLD/europe/08/07/clone.legislation/index.html (last visited Dec. 15, 2001) (copy on file
with The Transnational Lawyer).
34. Id.
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This panic has resulted in scenes of airport inspectors in Munich and
Frankfurt seizing half-eaten sandwiches more or less from the mouths of arriving
British airline passengers." In Portugal and Cyprus, passengers have been subject
to disinfectant baths; in Brussels, angry farmers have blocked all the roads to the
EU headquarters with barricades and bonfires.36 At nearly the same time, a
lengthy analysis in the New York Times of human cloning chose to focus on the
efforts of an obscure sect, led by a self-proclaimed alien abductee, for whom
cloning is a central tenet in a program to achieve immortality.37 If that sounds like
science fiction, it is no more so than the visions of Frankenstein monsters, world
munching super-bugs, and legions of Arnold Schwarzenegger-cloned storm
troopers that are sometimes bandied about by those intent on frightening
themselves or others. And those visions-those fears and phobias-including
images of jobs lost to third-world workers willing to work for a pittance while
greedy multinational corporations abscond with unconscionable profits and foul
the earth, are the context in which much of the public debate proceeds.
IV. CONCLUDING REMARKS: THE FUTURE OF INTERNATIONAL
TRADE IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY
My goal is not to disparage nor despair, but to bring into sharp focus the
dramatic shift that has occurred in the terms of the debate over international trade
and the issues on which its future now depends. Serious public questions have
been raised about the unintended adverse economic and social consequences of
unrestrained trade. Grave public doubts persist about inherently anti-democratic
features of the WTO, the European Union, and other transnational regimes. Sharp
critiques have been published of the impact and propriety of interventions by the
IMF and other organizations attempting to promote international stability. Deep-
seated fear exists about the commercial implications of newly developing
technology and the capacity of markets to implement those technologies before
their consequences are understood or accommodated. These doubts call into
question fundamental assumptions underlying the present structure of
international commerce.
If we who care about international trade wish to play a meaningful and
constructive part in this debate, we must be prepared to deal head-on with these
public doubts and to do so in the public and highly politicized atmosphere that
seems likely to prevail for the foreseeable future. Of course, we will continue our
discussions of the legal and technical issues that have been our traditional
35. Martin Fletcher & Roger Boyes, Germany Confiscates Britons' Sandwiches, TIMES (London), Feb.
27, 2001, available at http:lwww.thetimes.co.uklarticlelO,,2-91285,00.htmll (last visited Dec. 15, 2001) (copy
on file with The Transnational Lawyer).
36. Stephen Castle & Imre Karacs, The Foot-and-Mouth Crisis; Reaction; Belgians Revolt as Europe's
Great Slaughter Starts, THE INDEP. (London), Feb. 27, 200 1, at 6.
37. Margaret Talbot, A Desire to Duplicate, N.Y. TIMBS MAG., Feb. 4,2001, at 40.
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concern. But we must also adapt to the new reality, learning to speak in new
ways to these new issues, in new fora, to new audiences. It is an important
challenge. It is a worthwhile objective. It is a task we ought not shirk.
V. EPILOGUE
A central purpose of my remarks on the occasion of the seminar of March 3,
2001, was to note, as others have before me, how fully international free trade
issues have now become enmeshed with deep-seated and far-reaching cultural
and political conflicts. Those who care passionately about free trade must
become accustomed to speaking in this highly-charged atmosphere in new fora
with a focus on what are essentially political issues. In our times, all important
questions have become political. Trade is no exception. It will not do, if we are to
be responsive to the needs of our times, to limit our participation to technical
questions and venues. In our times, scholarly disquisitions of technical issues
have no force to genuinely actuate trade policy. We must also directly engage the
debate of political values.
From the vantage point of several months' time and in the aftermath of the
tragic events of September 11, my point on March 3 was clearly and seriously
understated. The attack on the World Trade Center was an attack on world trade,
but even more so on capitalism and American culture. World trade is now
hostage to a war of cultures of vastly greater consequence than we had imagined.
The attacks of September 11 have laid bare both the scope of that conflict and the
extraordinary fragility of globalization and of civilization itself.
When the events of September 11 provoked the World Bank and the IMF to
cancel their imminent meetings, some organizations that had planned to protest
that session instead utilized their preparations to protest the anticipated response
to the attacks. The ready metamorphosis of an antiglobalization movement into
an antiwar movement reminiscent of the Vietnam War period creates a strong
impression that those groups are fundamentally not so much opposed to
globalization and free markets as they are simply anti-American and anti-
Western.
On the other side, the events of September 11 may increase uneasiness about
globalism; and provoke protectionist sentiment in the United States, including
support for tariffs and domestic job protection; heighten calls for immigration
controls; and erode tolerance for our tradition (de jure or de facto) of largely
permeable borders. There is also a prospect that reaction to September 11 will
cause the European Union to slacken the pace of its eastward expansion and
seriously reconsider its policy of open borders. The issues of internal security,
including border controls, Europe-wide policing, immigration, and extradition
between member states have suddenly risen high on the European agenda.
Viewed more broadly, September 11 has struck a body blow to the
internationalist assumption that global agreements on trade and such projects as
universal criminal jurisdiction can be premised on the existence of an
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international "community" that shares an essential vision. Samuel P. Huntington,
in his celebrated book The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World
Order,38 has presented us with a starkly contrary view, one of essential conflict
among the competing values and aspirations of world cultures. Commenting on
September 11, Paul Johnson has asserted that, "[a]ttacking terrorism at its roots
necessarily involves conflict with the second-largest religious community in the
world."39 And our new Nobel Laureate, V.S. Naipaul, has earlier suggested that
the root of the poverty to be found in present-day India lies in the destructiveness
of historic Moslem conquest of the region.
40
The message of these expressions of Western alienation from Moslem
culture-that there is no common international community of values-perversely
concurs with the conclusion of their polar opposites, who place responsibility for
these events on what they see as American imperialism, particularly in
interventions in Afghanistan, the Persian Gulf, and Palestine; or on its proxies,
corporate capitalism and global trade, which are deemed to exploit the
populations of the third-world and to destroy their indigenous cultures. A timely
expression of the depth of this alienation was published on the eve of September
11. In the August-September issue of the International Socialist Review, Edward
W. Said, a prominent Columbia University academic and Palestinian activist,
stated that:
Terrorism has become a sort of screen created since the end of
the Cold War by policymakers in Washington .... It is
fabricated to keep the population afraid and insecure, and to
justify what the United States wishes to do globally. Any threat
to its interests, whether it's oil in the Middle East or its
geostrategic interests elsewhere, is labeled as terrorism .... Into
this vicious cycle feed a few groups like bin Laden's and the
people he commands, whether they are in Saudi Arabia or
Yemen or anywhere else. They're magnified and blown up to
insensate proportions that have nothing to do with their real
power and the real threat they represent. 41
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2002 / The Crisis in International Trade
In the wake of September 11, this latter view seems misguided and even
pernicious, but it is not likely to go away. These opposing sentiments-those
defending Western culture and those stridently antagonistic to it-present a
fundamental gulf of values buttressed by deep-seated hostility. Such
incompatibility might be glossed over in times of peace and prosperity in the
hope that international accords might literally paper over the discord until the
benefits of the new order become plain and dissolve all opposition. Such hopes
are futile and even dangerous when the consequences of discord are lives lost,
innocents maimed, fortunes ruined, and war made imminent. In parallel, and
quite independently of the fear of terrorism, anxious reappraisals recently have
appeared in important policy publications expressing doubt about the long-term
compatibility of the interests of even such traditional friends and allies as the
42United States and Europe.
Of course, this bleak evidence of conflict and discord is hardly the whole
story. Insecurity may move us to come together for the sake of mutual protection.
Looming conflict among nations and cultures provides good reason to face
differences and ameliorate grievances. A breakdown of free markets and
international trade serves to remind us of our stark legacy of economic
depression and military hostilities from past breakdowns. September 11 may
prove to be not the seedbed of chaos, but the shock that compels us to find
common ground.
The task is daunting. The hour is late. The risks are uncertain, but certainly
great. We must all focus clearly and be fully engaged, not only as teachers,
scholars, and lawyers, but as men and women faced with a challenge and
opportunity to struggle with issues of great moment and consequence.
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